Bundeswehr 3.0: The political, military and social dimensions of the reform of the German armed forces. OSW Point of View Number 28, May 2012 by Gotkowska, Justyna
This reform of the Bundeswehr, 
launched in 2011, is the latest  
of the three decisive stages in the 
post-war transformation of the 
German armed forces. The reform 
aims at “constructing” the armed 
forces anew in the political, military 
and social dimensions. The present 
paper presents the evolution of the 
role of the armed forces in German 
foreign and security policy and the 
ongoing process of “constructing” 
a new Bundeswehr. it analyses the 
process of redefining the objectives 
and principles of: the Bundeswehr’s 
participation in international 
operations, its current military 
transformation, and changes in its 
image and social identity. it also 
presents the implications of this 
broader transformation for political 
and military cooperation within NATO 
and the EU.
Justyna Gotkowska
analyst in the centre for Eastern 
Studies, Department for Germany 
and Northern Europe. her areas of 
expertise include Germany’s foreign 
and security policy and security policy 
in the Nordic and Baltic countries Justyna Gotkowska
28
BUNDESWEHR 3.0
ThE POliTicAl, MiliTARy AND SOciAl 
DiMENSiONS OF ThE REFORM OF ThE GERMAN 
ARMED FORcES
NUMBER 28
WARSAW
MAY 2012
BUNDESWEHR 3.0
ThE poliTicAl, MiliTARY ANd SociAl 
diMENSioNS of ThE REfoRM of ThE GERMAN 
ARMEd foRcES
Justyna Gotkowska
© copyright by ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich
im. Marka Karpia / centre for Eastern Studies
content editors
olaf osica, Anna Kwiatkowska-drożdż
Editor
Anna Łabuszewska
co-operation
Katarzyna Kazimierska
Translation
Anna Kucińska
co-operation
Nicholas furnival
Graphic design 
pARA-BUch
dTp
GroupMedia
pUBliShER
Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia 
centre for Eastern Studies
ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, poland
phone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00
fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40
osw.waw.pl
iSBN 978-83-62936-11-3
Contents
Key points /5
introduction /7
I. the Bundeswehr as a political instrument  
of Germany /8
II. the military dimension of the reform /13
1. improving expeditionary capabilities /16
2. challenges for the Bundeswehr’s transformation /22
III. the social dimension of the reform /25
1. problems with legitimacy /25
2. the new image and identity of the Bundeswehr /27
IV. the implications for nato and the eu /30
1. the implications for political cooperation within nato  
and the eu /30
2. the implications for military cooperation within nato  
and the eu /32
appendix /36
1. 1993: Volker rühe’s reform /36
2. 1999: rudolf scharping’s reform /38
3. 2003/2004: peter struck’s reform /40

P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
5/
20
12
5
Key points
•	 The	reform	of	the	Bundeswehr,	launched	in	2011,	aims	at	“con-
structing”	 the	 German	 armed	 forces	 anew	 in	 the	 political,	
military	and	social	dimensions.	
In	the	political	dimension	Germany	is	redefining	the	role,	ob-
jectives	and	principles	of	employing	the	Bundeswehr	as	an	in-
strument	in	foreign,	security	and	(also)	economic	policies.	The	
new	Bundeswehr	is	set	to	be	an	instrument	(to	be	used	as	a	last	
resort)	of	supporting	and	protecting	German	interests	in	the	
world.	The	Bundeswehr	will	 thus	become	 the	same	as	other	
allied	armed	forces.	Germany’s	engagement	in	NATO	and	EU	
operations	will	be	subject	to	sovereign	decision	of	the	German	
government	and	not	 the	result	of	 the	political	commitments	
connected	with	membership	in	NATO	and	the	EU.	
In	 the	military	dimension	 the	 reform’s	objective	 is	 to	 create	
a	military	which	 is	 smaller	 but	more	 effective,	well-trained	
and	which	uses	modern	equipment.	The	changes	in	structure,	
processes,	capabilities	and	military	equipment	are	designed	to	
optimise	its	expeditionary	profile.	
In	 the	social	 sphere	 the	reform	is	 intended	 to	provide	social	
legitimacy	 for	 the	new	model	of	 the	armed	 forces	and,	 indi-
rectly,	to	increase	the	appeal	of	professional	military	service	
in	Germany.	
•	 Both	the	premises	of	the	present	reform	and	the	developments	
of	German	security	policy	will	have	an	impact	on	Germany’s	
approach	to	political	and	military	cooperation	within	NATO	
and	the	EU.	The	main	criterion	for	decision	making	about	the	
participation	in	EU,	NATO	and	UN	operations	will	be	Germa-
ny’s	 interests.	 The	 participation	 in	 international	 operations	
will	 however	 remain	 the	 ultima	 ratio	 for	 Germany.	 Grow-
ing	energy	and	economic	links	and	the	wish	to	develop	good	
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relations	with	emerging	economies	will	influence	Germany’s	
reluctance	to	take	part	in	operations	in	regions	which	are	seen	
as	 the	spheres	of	 influence	of	 these	countries.	Germany	will	
also	 be	 cautious	 in	 engaging	 in	 operations	 in	Muslim	 coun-
tries,	in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa,	as	this	could	affect	
its	image	as	well	as	the	political	and	economic	position	in	the	
region.	
•	 The	 premises	 of	 the	 Bundeswehr’s	 transformation	 and	 the	
evolution	of	Germany’s	security	policy	fit	in	with	the	existing	
fragmentation	 tendencies	within	 the	 EU	 (CSDP)	 and	NATO.	
They	also	go	 in	 line	with	the	tendency	to	use	the	structures	
of	both	organisations	by	the	largest	member	states	to	achieve	
their	national	objectives.	
•	 In	the	discussions	within	NATO	and	the	EU	about	closer	mil-
itary	cooperation,	Germany	will	not	be	ready	 to	develop	co-
operation	which	would	result	in	a	permanent	dependence	on	
partners	in	using	certain	capabilities	in	international	opera-
tions	 (this	 concerns	above	all	units	 involved	 in	 combat	mis-
sions).	However,	Germany	will	take	part	in	(limited)	coopera-
tion	projects,	for	example	in	the	areas	of	logistics	and	training,	
which	do	not	involve	too	much	dependence	for	Germany	and	
which	generate	military	and	political	gains.	Germany	has	in-
dicated	the	political	and	military	constraints	of	the	smart	de-
fence	(NATO)	and	pooling	and	sharing	(the	EU)	concepts	cur-
rently	being	discussed.	
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introduction 
Since	its	establishment	in	1955	the	Bundeswehr	has	been	perceived	
in	Germany	 as	 an	 important	 instrument	 for	 achieving	 goals	 in	
foreign	and	security	policies.	However,	the	legacy	of	World	War	II	
was	a	burden	for	the	German	armed	forces,	 forcing	the	govern-
ment	in	Bonn,	and	later	in	Berlin,	to	devise	a	concept	which	would	
justify	the	existence	of	the	Bundeswehr	and	legitimise	its	role	and	
missions	in	the	military	aspect,	in	internal	policy	and	in	relations	
with	Germany’s	allies.	
The	 first	 concept	 was	 established	 in	 the	 Cold	War	 period.	 The	
second	was	created	after	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	
reunification	of	Germany.	These	events	brought	about	geopoliti-
cal	changes	in	Europe	and	in	transatlantic	relations	which	forced	
a	 redefinition	 of	 the	 goals	 and	principles	 of	 deploying	 the	mili-
tary	after	1990.	As	a	result,	the	political	and	military	concept	of	
the	Bundeswehr	was	transformed.	A	similar	process	is	currently	
underway.	It	has	been	brought	about	by	the	strategic	transforma-
tions	 taking	place	 in	Europe:	 the	EU	and	NATO	are	undergoing	
changes	and	the	position	of	Germany	in	its	relations	with	its	allies	
is	 being	 strengthened.	 The	 current	 reform	 of	 the	 Bundeswehr,	
launched	in	2011,	is	intended	to	“construct”	German	armed	forces	
anew	in	the	political,	military	and	social	dimensions.	
The	present	paper	presents	the	evolution	of	the	Bundeswehr’s	role	
in	German	foreign	and	security	policy	and	the	ongoing	process	of	
“constructing”	a	new	military.	The	paper	discusses	the	objectives	
of	the	military	transformation	and	the	change	in	the	image	and	
social	 identity	of	 the	German	armed	 forces.	 It	 also	analyses	 the	
implications	of	this	new	concept	of	the	Bundeswehr	for	political	
and	military	cooperation	within	NATO	and	the	EU.	
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i. the Bundeswehr as a political 
instrument of Germany 
(1)	The	consent	expressed	by	the	US	and	their	European	allies	for	
the	Bundeswehr	to	be	established	after world war ii	was	intend-
ed	to	increase	West	Germany’s	contribution	to	NATO’s	territorial	
defence	and	deterrence	doctrine.	For	the	government	in	Bonn	the	
role	of	the	Bundeswehr	from	the	very	beginning	extended	beyond	
that	of	ensuring	the	security	of	the	state	and	society.	The	armed	
forces	 were	 treated	 as	 an	 instrument	 of	 foreign	 policy,	 which	
helped	 to	 gradually	 increase	 the	 degree	 of	West	 Germany’s	 po-
litical	autonomy	with	regard	to	the	allies1.	However,	the	legacy	of	
World	War	II	weighed	heavily	on	the	West	German	armed	forces.	
Therefore	a	political	 and	 social	 concept	of	 the	Bundeswehr	was	
established	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 the	Bundeswehr’s	 democratic	 le-
gitimacy	and	its	acceptance	by	West	German	society	and	the	West	
European	states.	
With	the	division	of	roles	 in	NATO	during	the	Cold	War	period,	
two	factors	ensured	that	the	existence	of	the	West	German	armed	
forces	 (intended	 to	 ultimately	 reach	 nearly	 half	 a	 million	 sol-
diers)	was	accepted by the allies	(above	all	those	from	Western	
Europe).	Firstly,	the	Bundeswehr	was	defined	in	the	constitution	
(Grundgesetz)	as	a	military	serving	exclusively	to	defend	the	ter-
ritory	of	West	Germany	within	NATO.	Secondly,	the	government	
in	 Bonn	 accepted	 military restrictions	 imposed	 on	 the	 Bun-
deswehr:	the	 lack	of	a	General	Staff,	the	organisational	 focus	of	
the	armed	forces	on	territorial	self-defence	and	the	subordination	
of	the	German	army	and	the	combat	units	of	the	air	force	and	the	
navy	to	the	integrated	NATO	command	structures.	the domestic 
1	 In	return	for	remilitarisation,	for	access	to	NATO	and	to	the	(newly	estab-
lished)	Western	European	Union	and	for	fulfilling	commitments	resulting	
from	membership	in	both	organisations,	West	Germany	gained	the	lifting	
of	the	occupation	statute,	the	recognition	of	the	government	in	Bonn	as	the	
only	 legal	 representative	 of	 the	whole	 Germany	 and	 the	 confirmation	 of	
support	for	the	reunification	of	the	two	German	states.	
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legitimacy, i.e.	 the	acceptance	of	West	German	society,	 critical	
of	 the	 remilitarisation	of	 the	 country,	 for	 the	Bundeswehr,	was	
ensured	by	the	philosophy	of	the	“citizen	in	uniform”.	This	con-
cept	consisted	of	the	principle	of	the	“leadership	development	and	
civic	education”2	(Innere	Führung)	and	of	conscription.	The	prin-
ciple	of	Innere	Führung	implied	that	soldiers	were	citizens	with	
a	critical	approach	to	the	legality	of	the	orders	they	were	given.	
Mandatory	military	service	was	intended	to	create	a	sense	of	re-
sponsibility	for	the	country	and	also	to	fulfil	the	function	of	inte-
grating	the	armed	forces	with	society.	
(2) the end of the cold war	brought	about	fundamental	chang-
es	 in	Germany’s	 foreign	 and	 security	 policy	which	were	 due	 to	
Germany’s	 reunification	 and	 regaining	 of	 full	 sovereignty	 and	
changes	in	the	security	environment.	Thus	the	German	govern-
ment	redefined	the	goals	and	principles	of	the	deployment	of	the	
Bundeswehr	 in	 its	 foreign	 policy.	 It	 was	 deemed	 that	 the	 Bun-
deswehr	should	remain	the	instrument	used	to	increase	Germa-
ny’s	importance	within	NATO,	extend	the	country’s	influence	at	
the	UN	and	strengthen	its	position	with	regard	to	France	and	the	
UK	in	the	Western	European	Union	(WEU).	German	participation	
in	preventive,	stabilisation	and	crisis	response	operations	abroad	
were	to	be	the	means	to	this	end.	The	political,	military	and	social	
concept	of	the	Bundeswehr	dating	back	to	the	period	of	the	Cold	
War	did	not	fit	into	the	new	realities.	Germany	had	to	“construct”	
anew	its	armed	forces	–	i.e.	to	acquire	legitimacy	at	home	and	ac-
ceptance	abroad	for	a	model	of	an	expeditionary	military	-	and	to	
launch	necessary	military	reforms.	
the international acceptance of	 Germany’s	 military	 engage-
ment	 abroad	 has	 already	 partly	 existed.	 Due	 to	 Germany’s	 full	
integration	 in	 the	 EU	 and	NATO	 and	 the	 predictability	 of	 Ger-
man	policies,	above	all	the	US	began	even	to	expect	that	Germany,	
2	 Official	 German	 translation.	 Source:	 Innere	 Führung	 is	 our	 established	
means	of	guidance,	04.12.06,	www.bmvg.de	
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which	 previously	 benefited	 from	 NATO’s	 protective	 umbrella,	
would	 fully	 participate	 in	 crisis	 management	 operations.	 The	
“multilateralism	 doctrine”	 in	 German	 security	 policy	 was	 also	
intended	 to	 ensure	 international	 acceptance	 for	 the	 expansion	
of	Germany’s	military	involvement	abroad	in	the	1990s.	The	doc-
trine	excluded	independent	German	decisions	on	security	issues	
which	would	be	contrary	to	the	policies	of	the	US	or	France	and	
implied	political	and	military	support	for	actions	taken	by	these	
allies	within	NATO,	the	EU	and	the	UN.	Germany	also	intended	to	
gradually	 familiarise	mainly	European	countries	with	 the	Bun-
deswehr’s	engagement	abroad.	This	was	done	by	a	slow	increase	
of	Germany’s	 involvement	 in	NATO,	EU	and	UN	operations	and	
a	 gradual development of the expeditionary capabilities of 
the armed forces	(see	Appendix).
The	domestic legitimacy	of	the	Bundeswehr’s	evolution	towards	
expeditionary	armed	forces	focused	on	international	operations	
was	the	greatest	challenge	for	the	German	government.	Legal	le-
gitimacy	was	ensured	by	the	ruling	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	
Court	in	1994.	The	court	recognised	that	Germany’s	membership	
in	the	systems	of	collective	security	and	collective	defence	organi-
sations	and	resulting	tasks	are	compatible	with	the	Grundgesetz.	
This	ruling	paved	the	way	for	the	Bundeswehr’s	engagement	in	UN,	
NATO	and	WEU	(later	EU)	operations	providing	that	the	govern-
ment	obtained	the	approval	of	the	Bundestag.	However,	the	social	
legitimacy	of	the	Bundeswehr,	based	on	the	“citizen	in	uniform”	
philosophy	was	not	adjusted	to	the	new	goals	and	rules	of	the	Bun-
deswehr’s	deployment	and	thus	gradually	became	outdated.	Not	
only	did	the	principle	of	Innere	Führung	become	devalued,	but	the	
proportion	and	importance	of	conscripts	in	the	armed	forces	also	
declined.	The	government	believed	that	a	gradual	increase	in	the	
Bundeswehr’s	 engagement	 abroad	would	make	 German	 society	
grow	accustomed	to	it.	The	government	also	explained	the	armed	
forces	participation	in	international	operations	by	the	necessity	
for	a	united	Germany	to	take	“international	responsibility”.	This	
move	 proved	 successful	 regarding	 stabilisation	 operations	 but	
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met	with	opposition	 from	society	when	German	 troops	became	
involved	in	combat	tasks	in	Afghanistan.	
(3) over the last decade (whose	beginning	may	be	marked	by	the	
September	11th	attacks	in	New	York)	the	process	of	disintegration	
of	the	Atlantic	consensus	about	the	role	and	the	mode	of	NATO’s	
functioning	has	intensified,	which	has	also	affected	the	EU’s	Com-
mon	Security	and	Defence	Policy.	
This	is	manifested	by	the	increased	instrumentalisation	of	both	
NATO	and	EU	structures	by	its	largest	member	countries	(the	US,	
France)	to	achieve	their	national	objectives.	This	process	has	also	
extended	 to	 Germany,	which	 has	 gradually	 been	 shifting	 away	
from	the	“multilateralism	doctrine”	to	conditional	support	for	ac-
tions	undertaken	by	its	allies	within	NATO,	the	EU	and	the	UN.	
Paradoxically,	 the	 emancipation	 of	 German	 security	 policy	 im-
plied	not	a	greater	autonomy	and	readiness	to	deploy	the	armed	
forces,	 but	 an	 increasingly	 cautious	 approach	 to	 participation	
in	 international	operations.	However,	unlike	 in	 the	 1990s	when	
arguments	 of	 a	 historical	 nature	were	 raised,	 national	 interest	
is	now	more	likely	to	be	the	determining	factor.	The	first	exam-
ple	of	 this	approach	was	Germany’s	opposition	 to	 the	American	
intervention	in	Iraq	in	2003	and	non-participation	in	the	“coali-
tion	of	the	willing”.	Another	case	in	question	was	when	Germany	
refused	to	participate	in	the	EU	operation	in	Chad,	promoted	by	
France.	
The	new	 interpretation	of	German	 interests	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the	
Bundeswehr	were	also	demonstrated	by	Germany’s	resistance	to	
the	significant	extension	of	its	involvement	in	Afghanistan.	The	
new	approach	was	shown	best	by	 the	recent	German	opt-out	of	
the	international	and	later	NATO-led	operation	in	Libya	in	2011,	
championed	by	France	and	the	UK3.	
3	 See:	Justyna	Gotkowska,	No	more	compulsory	engagement.	The	emancipa-
tion	of	German	security	policy,	OSW	Commentary,	July	2011.
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The	 process	 of	 redefining	 the	 goals	 and	 principles	 of	 the	 Bun-
deswehr’s	deployment	abroad	started	alongside	Germany’s	grow-
ing	political	 independence	with	regard	to	 its	allies.	The	reform,	
launched	 in	 2011,	 is	 to	 seal	 the	 ongoing	 transformations	 in	 the	
political	and	military	areas	and	to	introduce	a	new	social	legiti-
macy	of	the	Bundeswehr.	The	Bundeswehr	will	thus	become	the	
same	as	other	allied	armed	forces.	 Its	deployment	 in	NATO	and	
EU	operations	will	depend	on	Germany’s	sovereign	decision	and	
will	not	 the	result	of	 the	political	commitments	connected	with	
membership	in	NATO	and	the	EU.	The	German	political	elite	are	
convinced	that	more	than	60	years	after	the	end	of	World	War	II	
Germany	does	not	have	to	be	guided	by	historical	reasons	in	shap-
ing	its	security	policy.	The	improvement	of	the	expeditionary	pro-
file	of	 the	armed	 forces	 is	 therefore	underway,	 accompanied	by	
the	establishment	of	a	new	social	legitimacy	of	the	Bundeswehr.
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ii. the military dimension of the reform 
The	current	reform,	which	the	Federal	Ministry	of	Defence	refers	
to	as	Neuausrichtung4, in	 its military	aspects is	part	of	 a	wider	
process	of	the	transformation	of	the	German	armed	forces	initi-
ated	at	 the	beginning	of	the	1990s	(see	Appendix).	 It	constitutes	
a	consecutive	stage	of	the	transformation	launched	in	2004	–	the	
concept	devised	in	the	US	and	understood	as	a	continuous	process	
of	adjusting	the	armed	forces	to	new	challenges	and	circumstanc-
es.	The	2011	reform	was	directly	caused	by	problems	with	regard	
to	the	operation	run	in	Afghanistan	and	budget	savings.	
Several	 years	 after	 the	 2003/2004	 reform	 authored	 by	 Peter	
Struck,	the	Defence	Minister	in	the	SPD/Greens	government	(see	
Appendix),	it	turned	out	that	the	structures	and	procedures	then	
introduced	 in	 the	 Bundeswehr	 did	 not	 take	 fully	 into	 account	
challenges	met	during	the	operation	in	Afghanistan.	The	internal	
report	prepared	by	the	Federal	Ministry	of	Defence	in	2007,	“The	
Bundeswehr’s	 international	 operations”	 enumerated	 the	 short-
comings	in	the	planning,	command	and	execution	of	operations	
abroad,	including	the	ISAF	mission	in	Afghanistan,	in	the	coordi-
nation	of	the	branches	of	the	armed	forces	and	of	different	levels	
of	command,	in	the	duplication	of	structures,	excessive	red	tape,	
and	in	insufficient	combat	equipment	and	financing	of	the	armed	
forces.	However,	there	was	not	enough	political	will	in	the	Federal	
Ministry	of	Defence	headed	in	2007	by	Franz-Josef	Jung	(CSU)	to	
implement	reforms	which	were	necessary	but	controversial	back	
home.	After	2008	the	Bundeswehr	had	to	face	up	to	more	serious	
4	 The	work	on	the	reform	was	launched	by	Defence	Minister	Karl-Theodor	zu	
Guttenberg	(CSU)	who	supervised	the	creation	of	the	reform’s	initial	prem-
ises	and	made	the	decision	to	suspend	conscription.	The	reform	was	contin-
ued	by	Defence	Minister	Thomas	de	Maizière	 (CDU).	The	ministry	 issued	
a	 series	 of	 documents:	Defence	Policy	Guidelines	 (May	2011);	 Plans	 of	 the	
new	structure	of	 the	Bundeswehr	(September	2011);	plans	 for	restructur-
ing	the	ministry	of	defence,	the	reduction	in	military	equipment	and	arms,	
increasing	the	appeal	of	military	service	and	a	new	dislocation	of	units	in	
Germany	(October	2011);	the	reservists’	concept	(November	2011).	
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challenges	due	to	the	deteriorating	security	situation	in	Northern	
Afghanistan	and	to	further	extend	the	range	of	the	armed	forces’	
tasks5.	This	forced	the	CDU/CSU/FDP	government	in	autumn	2009	
to	 include	 in	 its	coalition	agreement	a	declaration	to	 implement	
the	consecutive	stage	of	the	transformation.	
An	 important	 incentive	 to	 introduce	 a	 deep	 reform	of	 the	Bun-
deswehr	was	provided	by	the	economic	crisis	and	the	four-year	
austerity	plan	of	the	federal	government	of	June	2010.	Under	this	
plan	 the	 Federal	Ministry	 of	Defence	was	 set	 to	 save	 8.3	 billion	
euros	 in	 total	 by	 2014.	 This	motivated	 the	ministry	 to	 consider	
a	 number	 of	 options	 and	 their	 possible	 implications	 for	 the	 ca-
pabilities	of	the	Bundeswehr.	Nevertheless,	despite	the	fact	that	
the	direct	incentive	to	implement	the	reform	was	the	search	for	
savings,	 in	 2011	 the	 government	 agreed	 that	 the	 Federal	Minis-
try	of	Defence	would	not	have	to	fulfil	its	obligations	made	in	the	
June	2010	agreement6.	By	2014	 it	will	have	a	budget	 comparable	
or	even	slightly	higher	than	the	one	of	2010	(Germany’s	defence	
spending	in	recent	years	fluctuated	between	1.3	and	1.4%	of	Ger-
man	GDP)7.	Furthermore,	costs	linked	with	the	reduction	in	civil-
ian	staff	will	be	removed	from	the	ministry’s	budget8.	Additional	
funding	for	the	implementation	of	the	reform	will	be	“obtained”	
5	 The	army	set	up	then	the	first	combat	unit	after	the	end	of	World	War	II	–	
Quick	Reaction	Force	with	300	soldiers.	
6	 The	plans	from	June	2010	allowed	for	the	following	budget	of	the	Ministry	of	
Defence	in	2012-2014:	in	2012	–	30.9	billion	euros,	in	2013	–	29.6	billion	euros,	
in	2014	–	27.7	billion	euros.	See:	Bundestag,	Antwort	der	Bundesregierung	
auf	die	Kleine	Anfrage	Bündnis	90/Die	Grünen:	Sparbeitrag	des	Verteidi-
gungshaushaltes,	Drucksache	17/7293,	11.10.2011.
7	 SIPRI,	The	SIPRI	Military	Expenditure	Database,	http://milexdata.sipri.org/	
8	 In	line	with	the	German	Grundgesetz	there	is	a	civilian	administration	of	
the	 Bundeswehr	 (Bundeswehrverwaltung)	which	 performs	 functions	 re-
lating	 to	procurement,	 real	estate	and	personal	management	 (territoriale	
Wehrverwaltung)	and	the	purchase	of	arms,	information	and	IT	manage-
ment	(Rüstungsbereich).	
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from	 gradual	 decrease	 in	 German	 military	 involvement	 in	 Af-
ghanistan	(the	German	contingent	had	in	the	beginning	of	2012	
approximately	5,000	troops).		9				10						11
the budget of the federal ministry of defence, 2006–2011 (billion euros)9
2006 27.8
2007 28.4
2008 29.5
2009 31.2
2010 31.1
2011 31.5
the forecasted budget of the federal ministry of defence  
for 2012–2015 (billion euros)10
2012
31.7	(according	to	earlier	agree-
ments11	30.9)
2013
31.4	(according	to	earlier	agree-
ments	29.6)
2014
30.9	(according	to	earlier	agree-
ments	27.7)
2015 30.4	
9	 Data	 from	 the	 Federal	Ministry	 of	 Defence,	 Bundesministerium	 der	Ver-
teidigung,	www.bmvg.de
10	 Bundesfinanzministerium,	Unterrichtung	des	Bundes,	Finanzplan	des	Bundes	
2011	 bis	 2015,	 source:	 http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_137300/
DE/Wirtschaft__und__Verwaltung/Finanz__und__Wirtschafts	politik/Bun-
deshaushalt/Bundeshaushalt__2012/20110905-Bundeshaushalt12-Finanzpla
n,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf
11	 See	footnote	6.
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1. Improving expeditionary capabilities
In	 the	military	 dimension,	 the	 objective	 is	 to	 create	 a	military	
which	is	smaller	but	more	effective,	excellently	trained,	and	pro-
vided	with	modern	equipment.	The	changes	in	the	structure,	pro-
cesses,	 capabilities	 and	military	 equipment	 are	 geared	 towards	
improvements	 in	 the	 expeditionary	 profile	 of	 the	 Bundeswehr.	
Germany	 still	 considers	 there	 to	 be	 a	 negligible	 likelihood	 of	
a	conventional	armed	attack	on	German	territory	and	is	focusing	
above	all	on	analysing	threats	which	can	have	a	negative	impact	
on	the	 international	economic	flow.	Germany	wishes	to	develop	
its	military	capabilities	with	regard	to	its	increased	independence	
from	its	allies	and	to	fill	in	the	gaps	in	the	capabilities	needed	in	
order	to	complete	the	tasks	it	could	not	undertake	alone.	In	devel-
oping	the	armed	forces’	capabilities	the	ministry	wants	to	follow	
the	principle	of	Breite vor Tiefe	that	is	to	maintain	the	widest	possi-
ble	range	of	capabilities.	However	this	will	also	mean	prioritising	
certain	capabilities	while	decreasing	the	efficiency/effectiveness	
in	areas	less	significant	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	ministry.	
By	 2015	 the	 number	 of	 Bundeswehr	 troops	 will	 total	 185,000	
(170,000	professional	and	contract	soldiers	and	5,000-15,000	sol-
diers	involved	in	a	volunteer	military	service	lasting	from	12	to	23	
months).	The	armed	forces	will	be	thus	reduced	by	25,000	profes-
sional	and	contract	soldiers	(which	is	less	than	the	initially	pro-
posed	reduction	of	40,000).	The	number	of	civilian	employees	will	
also	be	downsized	–	from	75,000	to	55,000	(a	reduction	of	20,000).	
The	army	and	the	air	force	will	be	scaled	down	by	approximately	
a	third	(respectively	to	57,500	and	22,500	soldiers),	the	navy	will	
be	 diminished	 by	 approximately	 14%	 (to	 13,000	 soldiers)12.	 The	
Bundeswehr	 is	 to	 generate	 up	 to	 10,000	 troops	 to	 be	 deployed	
12	 The	 Joint	Medical	Service	will	have	 14,600	 soldiers	 (reduced	by	26%),	 the	
Joint	Support	Service	will	have	36,700	soldiers	(reduced	by	37%)	and	30,000	
soldiers	will	 be	 in	 training	 or	work	 in	 such	 areas	 as	 infrastructure,	 the	
maintenance	of	military	equipment,	IT	etc.
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in	 international	operations	at	 the	same	time	(currently	 it	 is	ap-
proximately	7,000).	The	armed	forces	will	further	develop	the	ca-
pabilities	needed	for	Germany	to	take	on	the	role	of	a	framework	
nation	in	conducting	operations	abroad13.	Despite	reductions	the	
Federal	Ministry	of	Defence	announced	that	Germany	will	main-
tain	its	contribution	to	the	NATO	Response	Force	and	the	EU	Bat-
tle	Groups	at	the	previous	level.	
The	 reduction	 in	 the	 number	 of	 soldiers	 has	 been	 linked	 with	
the	 complete	 professionalisation	 of	 the	 armed	 forces.	 In	 July	
2011	conscription	was	suspended	and	as	a	result	55,000	places	for	
conscripts	and	conscripts	who	opted	 for	service	extension	were	
eliminated.	At	the	same	time	a	new	Bundeswehr	reservists’	con-
cept	was	introduced	that	increases	their	importance	in	the	new	
structure	of	the	armed	forces14.	A	substantial	change	will	be	made	
in	 the	area	of	training.	The	earlier	division	of	 the	Bundeswehr	
into	intervention,	stabilisation	and	support	forces	will	be	elimi-
nated.	The	goal	is	to	adjust	the	armed	forces	to	the	realities	of	op-
erations	currently	run	since	they	combine	both	elements	of	sta-
bilisation	and	combat	 tasks.	Soldiers	will	be	 trained	 to	perform	
a	broad	spectrum	of	tasks	in	both	low-	and	high-intensity	opera-
tions.	Furthermore,	following	the	statements	made	by	Thomas	de	
Maizière,	in	the	future	the	Bundeswehr	will	confine	its	activity	
to	military	operations	and	will	not,	contrary	to	the	present	situa-
tion,	undertake	actions	in	the	area	of	development	cooperation	or	
policing.	Changes	will	also	be	introduced	in	the	organisation	of	
the	branches	of	the	armed	forces,	command	structures	(a	reduc-
tion	in	the	number	of	commands,	a	strengthening	of	the	position	
13	 Bundesministerium	der	Verteidigung,	Defence	Policy	Guidelines,	27.05.2011,	
www.bmvg.de
14	 Bundesministerium	der	Verteidigung,	Konzeption	der	Reserve,	01.02.2012,	
www.bmvg.de.	The	new	concept	introduces	the	division	into	reservists	who	
support	the	Bundeswehr	units	in	operations	abroad	when	the	need	arises	
(Truppenreserve),	reservists	assigned	to	territorial	defence	tasks,	actions	
undertaken	in	response	to	natural	disasters	or	the	protection	of	critical	in-
frastructure	(Territoriale	Reserve)	and	finally	–	reservists	not	assigned	to	
specific	tasks	(Allgemeine	Reserve).	
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of	the	General	Inspector	of	the	Bundeswehr)	and	the	structure	of	
the	Federal	Ministry	of	Defence	with	the	aim	of	increasing	its	ef-
ficiency	and	simplifying	decision-making	and	bureaucratic	pro-
cesses.	
As	far	as	military equipment	is	concerned,	the	reform	allows	for	
a	reduction	 in	older	equipment	 in	use	and	equipment	currently	
being	planned15	/	being	introduced	into	service16.	The	reason	be-
hind	the	reduction	in	purchases	of	new	equipment	is	not	to	make	
savings	but	rather	to	“release”	funding	for	the	equipment	which	in	
view	of	the	ministry	is	needed	more	in	Bundeswehr’s	internation-
al	operations.	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	budget	for	investments	
in	new	military	equipment	will	remain	the	same17.	In	the	past	the	
allocation	of	95%	of	funds	within	this	budget	was	appropriated	to	
financing	equipment	mostly	ordered	in	the	1990s	which	will	not	
be	needed	in	such	quantities	after	the	armed	forces	has	been	re-
duced	in	size	(Eurofighter,	Puma)	or	because	it	does	not	meet	the	
current	 requirements	 of	 the	 Bundeswehr	 (Tiger	multi-role	 fire	
support	helicopter	or	NH90	medium-sized	transport	helicopter)18.	
15	 On	condition	that	the	Ministry	of	Defence	reaches	an	agreement	with	de-
fence	industry.	
16	 The	largest	reductions	are	planned	in	the	army	and	the	air	force	and	will	
concern	 Leopard	 2	 tanks	 (from	 350	 to	 225),	 Puma	 infantry	 fighting	 vehi-
cles	 (from	 the	 planned	 410	 to	 350),	 Panzerhaubitze	 2000	 self-propelled	
howitzers	(from	148	to	81),	NH90	medium	sized	transport	helicopter	(from	
the	planned	122	 to	80),	Tiger	multi-role	fire	support	helicopters	 (from	the	
planned	80	 to	40),	Tornado	combat	aircraft	 (from	185	 to	85),	probably	Eu-
rofighter	combat	aircraft	 (currently	the	Luftwaffe	has	143	Eurofighters,	 it	
has	not	yet	made	a	decision	about	accepting	the	delivery	of	37	Eurofighters	
from	 the	 3B	 tranche)	 and	military	 transport	 aircraft	 (Transall	 –	 from	80	
to	60,	A400M	–	 from	the	planned	60	to	40).	The	plans	of	purchasing	new	
military	equipment	by	the	navy	will	not	be	changed;	the	oldest	models	of	
frigates	and	submarines	will	however	be	phased	out	more	quickly	or	have	
already	been	withdrawn	from	use.	
17	 It	now	amounts	 to	23%	of	 the	Bundeswehr’s	budget.	Minister	de	Maizière	
billigt	Umrüstung,	21.10.2011,	www.bmvg.de	
18	 Niemieccy	 eksperci	 krytykują	 NH90,	 23.02.2010,	 http://www.altair.com.
pl/start-4172,	 Bezużyteczne	 Tigery,	 26.05.2010,	 http://www.altair.com.pl/
start-4576	
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in the army the	strengthening	of	combat	capabilities	will	be	the	
most	 significant	 criterion	 for	 the	 realignment.	 This	 means	 an	
increase	in	combat	units,	the	reinforcement	of	infantry	and	the	
shifting	of	some	units	to	another	branch	of	the	armed	forces	(the	
air	defence	and	missile	defence	units	as	well	as	CH-53	heavy-lift	
transport	helicopters	will	be	moved	to	the	Luftwaffe).	The	infan-
try	will	become	mobile	and	light,	prepared	to	run	joint	operations	
and	to	perform	a	broad	spectrum	of	tasks19.	The	infantry	will	be	
strengthened	at	the	cost	of	the	reduction	in	armoured	and	artil-
lery	units,	which	is	visible	in	the	reduction	of	military	equipment	
–	tanks,	infantry	fighting	vehicles	and	self-propelled	howitzers.	
the	navy	will	improve	its	capabilities	for	participating	in	inter-
national	joint	operations	in	remote	regions.	It	will	also	undertake	
improvements	in	its	capabilities	of	supporting	land-based	opera-
tions	from	the	sea.	The	navy	has	been	undergoing	a	transforma-
tion	into	the	model	of	an	expeditionary	navy for	several	years20.	
Germany	 assesses	 that	 in	 the	 future	 the	 navy	 will	 be	 needed	
more	as	regards	 the	protection	of	German	citizens	and	German	
interests	 abroad	 and	 Germany’s	 participation	 in	 international	
joint	operations.	There	are	two	reasons	for	this.	The	protection	of	
maritime	 transport	 routes	 is	 of	 strategic	 importance	 to	Germa-
ny21.	Joint	operations	with	a	more	robust	participation	of	the	navy	
not	only	offer	more	military	options	but	also	expand	the	room	for	
manoeuvre	for	political	decisions.	Domestically	it	is	easier	to	ac-
19	 Informationen	zur	Grobstruktur	Heer,	www.bmvg.de	
20	 Klaus	von	Dambrowski,	Ein	maritimes	Konzept	für	das	gesamte	Einsatzs-
pektrum,	Maritime	Convention	1/2008,	p.	11–13.
21	 Germany	 is	 the	world’s	 third	 largest	 exporter.	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 a	 coun-
try	 highly	 industrialised	 but	 poor	 in	 natural	 resources.	 The	 prerequisite	
for	exports	of	goods	and	imports	of	natural	resources	and	thus	also	for	the	
development	of	 the	German	economy	 is	well-functioning	global	 trade.	As	
maritime	 transport	 is	 one	 of	 the	 safest,	 cheapest	 and	most	 environmen-
tally-friendly	means	of	transportation,	it	is	of	strategic	significance	to	the	
German	economy.	The	German	 trade	fleet	 consists	of	 3,500	ships	 (includ-
ing	600	registered	in	Germany)	and	thus	occupies	third	place	in	the	world	
(first	place	regarding	the	number	of	container	ships).	See:	Axel	Schimpf,	Die	
Deutsche	Marine	der	Zukunft,	Europäische	Sicherheit,	9/2011,	p.	30–36.
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cept	a	decision	to	operate	from	the	sea	without	establishing	land	
bases	and	internationally	it	is	easier	to	implement.	Therefore	the	
navy	will	be	affected	to	 the	 least	extent	by	the	reduction	 in	 the	
number	of	soldiers	(approximately	14%	compared	to	over	30%	in	
other	branches	of	the	armed	forces).	Reductions	will	not	affect	the	
purchase	of	new	military	equipment	which	has	been	on	the	draw-
ing	board	for	several	years22.	Joint	Support	Ships	(JSS)	planned	in	
the	new	structure	of	the	navy	show	the	direction	of	changes	be-
ing	made.	JSS	will	be	used	to	launch	joint	operations	from	the	sea	
and	will	increase	Germany’s	autonomy	with	regard	to	its	allies	in	
conducting	a	show	of	force	in	a	given	region,	in	conducting	land	
operations	from	the	sea,	evacuation	operations,	special	forces	op-
erations	as	well	as	humanitarian	and	support	tasks	in	response	
to	natural	disasters.	Due	to	financial	reasons,	the	order	for	these	
ships	will	be	probably	placed	in	2016/2018.	
As	 for	 the	 German	 air force,	 the	 transformed	 Luftwaffe	 will	
maintain,	 though	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 capabilities	 for	 the	 territo-
rial	defence	of	Germany	and	NATO.	The	air	force	will	retain	three	
wings	 (Geschwader)	 with	 Eurofighter	 combat	 aircraft.	 There	
will	be	only	one	wing	left	(out	of	the	current	three)	with	Tornado	
fighter	and	fighter-bomber	aircraft	capable	of	electronic	combat	
and	the	delivery	of	nuclear	weapons.	The	Bundeswehr	will	thus	
maintain	nuclear	sharing	capability	within	NATO.	Furthermore,	
the	German	air	force	will	develop	its	capabilities	for	participation	
in	 combined	 joint	 operations.	 Under	 the	Luftwaffe 2020 concept	
and	the	current	reform	the	air	force	will	also	prioritise	capabili-
ties	 that	 increase	 Germany’s	 political	 and	 military	 leverage	 in	
22	 In	approximately	2016	German	navy	will	have:	eleven	frigates	(four	state-
of-the-art	 F125s,	 three	 F124s,	 four	 F123s),	 five	 K130	 corvettes,	 three	 task	
force	suppliers	(Einsatzgruppenversorger	class	Berlin	ships)	to	provide	lo-
gistic	support	for	maritime	operations,	six	class	212A	submarines,	30	new	
helicopters,	ten	minesweepers	and	eight	P-C3	Orion	maritime	surveillance	
aircraft.	Most	likely	in	2019-2020	six	small	multi-task	ships	(Mehrzweck-
kampfschiff	180)	will	be	introduced	into	service	and	in	approximately	2016-
2018	two	ships	to	provide	logistic	support	for	land	operations	(Joint	Support	
Ships)	will	probably	be	ordered.	
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NATO	and	German	influence	on	conducting	international	opera-
tions.	Four	priority	areas23	are	mentioned:	military	use	of	space24,	
missile	defence25,	unmanned	aircraft	 systems26	 and	Air	Surface	
23	 Ralph	Thiele,	Reconsidering	the	Relevancy	of	Air	Power	–	German	Air	Force	
Development,	ISPSW	Strategy	Series	No.	162,	July	2011.
24	 The	Bundeswehr	uses	data	and	services	provided	by	satellite	systems	in	
the	area	of	communication,	reconnaissance,	navigation	and	geoinforma-
tion.	The	Bundeswehr	has	its	own	satellite	communication	systems	(SAT-
Com	Bw2)	 and	 satellite	 reconnaissance	 systems	 (SAR-Lupe)	which	were	
launched	in	recent	years.	In	the	area	of	reconnaissance	and	communica-
tion	Germany	is	seeking	to	maintain	its	autonomous	capabilities	and	will	
only	 supplement	 them	with	 participation	 in	 international	 projects.	 The	
Luftwaffe	is	responsible	for	developing	capabilities	in	the	area	of	the	use	
of	space,	for	protecting	and	maintaining	the	satellite	systems	currently	in	
use	and	for	operating	the	Space	Situational	Awareness	Centre	which	gath-
ers	and	verifies	information	obtained.	The	main	source	of	footnotes	22,	24,	
25,	26:	www.bundeswehr.de	
25	 The	Bundeswehr	is	building	missile	defence	capabilities	in	two	areas.	First-
ly,	with	 regard	 to	 protecting	German	military	 bases	 in	 international	 op-
erations.	The	MANTIS	short	range	air	defence	protection	system	(counter-
rocket,	artillery	and	mortar)	will	be	used	in	this	context	(the	Bundeswehr	
has	ordered	four	of	these).	Secondly,	Germany	is	taking	part	in	the	NATO	
ALTBMD	 (Active	 Layered	 Theatre	 Ballistic	 Missile	 Defence)	 programme	
which	 is	 aimed	 at	 protecting	NATO	 troops	during	 operations	 against	 the	
threat	posed	by	tactical	ballistic	missiles	with	ranges	up	to	3,000	kilometres	
and	which	could	become	part	of	the	NATO	missile	defence	system.	The	Ger-
man	contribution	to	the	ALTBMD	programme	will	be	probably,	after	the	in-
troduction	of	the	reform,	14	batteries	of	the	short-range	anti-missile	Patriot	
system	upgraded	 to	 the	PAC-3	version	and	 the	Surface	 to	Air	Missile	Op-
erations	Centre	(SAMOC).	Until	2011	Germany	took	part	in	the	development	
of	the	MEADS	programme	together	with	the	US	and	Italy,	this	programme	
was	intended	to	gradually	replace	the	Patriot	system.	Due	to	the	fact	that	
the	US	decided	 to	withdraw	 from	 the	MEADS	programme,	Germany	also	
abandoned	it	on	financial	grounds.	
26	 Germany	will	be	developing	unmanned	aircraft	systems	which	are	already	
completing	 for	and	 taking	over	 tasks	performed	by	multirole	combat	air-
craft	in	the	area	of	reconnaissance	and	support	for	land-based	operations.	
For	the	Luftwaffe	the	priority	is	to	develop	capabilities	not	only	in	the	range	
of	MALE	class	UAV	(the	equivalents	of	the	Israeli	IAI	Heron	UAV,	the	Bun-
deswehr	is	leasing	three	such	UAVs	until	2012	and	has	opted	for	developing	
a	system	of	the	same	class	by	German	companies,	possibly	in	cooperation	
with	 foreign	 partners).	 It	 also	wants	 to	 develop	 its	 capabilities	 in	 higher	
class	HALE	UAVs.	From	2015	onwards	 the	Luftwaffe	will	have	 four	HALE	
class	 Eurohawk	UAVs	 equipped	with	 signals	 intelligence	 (SIGNIT)	which	
will	be	the	German	“ear”	in	the	air.	As	part	of	the	German	contribution	to	
the	Alliance	Ground	Surveillance	Core	 system,	which	 is	 being	 developed	
now,	the	Bundeswehr	will	also	purchase	four	US	Global	Hawk	UAVs.	Ger-
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Integration	-	the	planning,	synchronisation	and	integration	of	the	
air	force,	army	and	navy	capabilities	available	within	an	opera-
tional	area	–	from	the	earth’s	surface	to	space	on	joint	operations.	
2. Challenges for the Bundeswehr’s transformation
Will	the	Bundeswehr	be	able	to	achieve	the	objectives	and	capa-
bilities	set	by	the	Federal	Ministry	of	Defence	within	the	present	
transformation	process?	The	implementation	of	the	reform	–	both	
in	the	military	and	political	aspects	–	will	 take	several	years.	 It	
will	be	possible	to	evaluate	the	results	when:	the	reorganisation	
of	the	armed	forces	takes	place,	new	procedures	are	introduced,	
new	command	structures	are	tested	for	operational	purposes,	the	
new	equipment	is	introduced	and	when	the	consequences	of	the	
suspension	of	conscription	is	discovered.	Nevertheless,	in	several	
areas	the	implementation	of	the	reform	will	run	into	difficulties.	
(1) Despite	 the	 introduction	 of	 financial	 and	 social	 incentives	
along	with	measures	 to	 increase	 the	 social	 recognition	 of	 serv-
ing	 in	 the	military,	 it	may	prove	difficult	 to	 recruit	 a	 sufficient	
number	 of	 volunteers	 (the	 expected	number	 ranges	 from	 5,000	
to	 15,000).	The	Bundeswehr’s	first	experiences	with	a	volunteer	
service	do	not	inspire	with	optimism	–	out	of	3,459	volunteers	en-
rolled	 in	 July	 2011	 22.5%	 left	within	a	 short	 amount	of	 time	 (re-
signed	 from	military	service	voluntarily	or	were	discharged).	 It	
remains	an	open	question	how	many	of	the	volunteers	currently	
performing	their	military	service	will	decide	to	stay	in	the	armed	
forces	as	contract	soldiers.	Military	officials	express	doubts	as	to	
whether	it	will	be	possible	in	the	future	to	maintain	the	expected	
size	of	the	armed	forces	(185,000	soldiers,	including	170,000	pro-
fessional	and	contract	soldiers)	and	indicate	unfavourable	demo-
graphic	trends	in	Germany.	Furthermore,	there	are	concerns	that	
man	 companies,	 commissioned	 by	 the	 Federal	 Ministry	 of	 Defence,	 are	
also	developing	projects	regarding	unmanned	combat	air	vehicles	(UCAVs)	
–	http://augengeradeaus.net/2012/01/zum-nachlesen-kampfdrohne-fur-
die-bundeswehr/	
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the	Bundeswehr	may	become	the	“armed	forces	of	the	lower	social	
classes”	(Unterschichtenarmee)27	and/or	a	military	whose	soldiers	
will	be	recruited	in	large	part	from	radical	right-wing	circles28.	
(2) The	reduction	in	the	number	of	troops	by	25,000	professional	
and	contract	soldiers	coupled	with	the	premise	that	up	to	10,000	
troops	(currently	7,000)	will	be	involved	in	international	opera-
tions	calls	into	question	the	feasibility	of	the	reform’s	guidelines.	
According	to	the	Federal	Ministry	of	Defence	and	military	officials	
this	can	be	achieved	through	high	quality	training	and	equipment	
but	will	also	involve	a	decrease	in	the	ability	of	the	Bundeswehr	to	
conduct	longer	and	more	demanding	international	operations	due	
to	overstretching	its	resources29.	
(3) In	the	years	to	come	the	Bundeswehr	will	still	struggle	with	
the	problem	of	a	shortage	of	military	equipment	ordered	several	
years	ago	and	not	yet	delivered	or	of	military	equipment	delivered	
and	returned	for	adjustment,	repair	or	upgrade.	This	may	be	due	
to	difficulties	in	the	production	process	of	the	German/European	
defence	industry	as	was	the	case	with	NH90	medium	sized	trans-
port	helicopters,	Tiger	multi-role	fire	support	helicopters,	A400M	
military	transport	aircraft,	K130	corvettes.	It	is	quite	likely	that	
several	 years	 will	 pass	 before	 this	 equipment	 will	 be	 commis-
sioned	into	service	with	the	German	armed	forces.	
(4) Even	 if	 the	Federal	Ministry	of	Defence	adopted	a	 long	 term	
budgetary	plan	(to	2015),	a	decrease	in	funds	allocated	to	the	re-
form	cannot	be	 ruled	out	 in	 the	coming	years.	The	government	
may	look	for	further	budget	savings	if	the	economic	and	financial	
crisis	in	the	EU	deteriorates.	Financial	setbacks	accompanied	by	
27	 Harald	Kujat, Das	Ende	 der	Wehrpflicht,	w:	Wehrpflicht	 und	Zivildienst,	
Aus	der	Politik	und	Zeitgeschichte,	48/2011,	November	2011,	pp.	3–7.
28	 Zwischen	 Verrohung	 und	 Verdummung,	 Handelsblatt,	 27.05.2011,	 http://
www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/zwischen-verrohung-und-
verdummung/4224518.html	
29	 Harald	Kujat,	Das	Ende	der	Wehrpflicht,	op.cit.
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possible	 recruitment	problems	could	 lead	 to	 a	decision	wherein	
the	Bundeswehr	will	decrease	further.	This	would	imply	further	
reductions	in	military	equipment	and/or	abandoning	certain	ca-
pabilities	(which	the	ministry	currently	wishes	to	avoid)30.	Such	
a	 development	 depends	 on	 whether	 the	 German	 government	
evaluates	 maintaining	 an	 effective	military	 with	 the	 ability	 to	
conduct	the	full	spectrum	of	capabilities	as	necessary	taking	into	
account	developments	in	the	international	security	environment.	
30	 Stephan	Löwenstein,	Das	unerreichte	Ende	der	Fahnenstange,	Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung,	02.01.2012,	p.	4.
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iii. the social dimension of the reform 
The	present	 stage	of	 the	 transformation	 is	also	 intended	 to	cre-
ate	new	social	legitimacy	for	a	Bundeswehr	that	is	improving	its	
expeditionary	profile	and	is	 intended	to	be	used	by	the	German	
government	precisely	as	any	other	allied	armed	forces	would	be.
1. Problems with legitimacy
acquiring social legitimacy for	the	Bundeswehr’s	evolution	to-
wards	an	expeditionary	military	focused	on	conducting	interna-
tional	operations	has	been	the	greatest	challenge	for	the	German	
government	 since	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 1990s.	 Consecutive	 gov-
ernments	hoped	that	German	society	would	slowly	grow	accus-
tomed	to	the	gradual	increase	in	the	Bundeswehr’s	participation	
in	international	operations.	Furthermore,	in	order	to	win	greater	
acceptance	 for	 foreign	 deployments	 of	 the	 Bundeswehr,	 a	 ficti-
tious	image	of	its	engagement	in	exclusively	“good”	stabilisation	
operations	was	maintained.	Due	to	the	lack	of	a	sufficient	infor-
mation	campaign	German	society’s	approach	to	the	Bundeswehr	
began	 to	 evolve	 towards	 a	 “friendly	 indifference”	 (freundliches	
Desinteresse)31.	At	the	same	time	society	was	sceptical	of	the	Bun-
deswehr	 taking	over	new	 tasks,	 and	Germany	used	 this	 fact	 in	
NATO	when	 justifying	 its	 lack	 of	 a	 larger	military	 involvement	
e.g.	 in	 the	 ISAF	operation	 in	Afghanistan.	However,	 this	fictive	
image	also	had	negative	implications	for	the	German	government	
itself.	In	recent	years	the	image	of	the	Bundeswehr	conveyed	by	
the	media	where	the	military	was	portrayed	as	a	quasi	“develop-
ment/policing	agency	in	uniforms”	clashed	with	the	actual	tasks	
performed	by	the	German	armed	forces	in	Afghanistan.	Within	
the	 last	 two	years	 the	Bundeswehr	has	had	 to	 substantially	ex-
tend	the	scope	of	operations	in	order	to	maintain	the	security	of	
31	 Köhler	 fordert	 mehr	 Aufklärung	 über	 Auslandseinsätze,	 Spiegel Online,	
27.11.2008,	http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,593131,	
00.html	
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its	own	contingent	and	of	the	northern	provinces.	This	move	has	
not	been	accompanied	by	an	adequate	 information	campaign	 in	
Germany	and	this	was	the	reason	for	one	of	the	largest	scandals	
concerning	 the	Bundeswehr	 in	 the	 last	 20	years.	The	 air	 strike	
against	two	tanker	trucks	called	by	a	German	commander	in	Sep-
tember	2009	in	the	Afghan	province	of	Kunduz	claimed	the	lives	
of	 approximately	 100	Afghan	civilians	while	 targeting	 the	Tali-
ban.	The	number	of	civilian	casualties	and	the	deliberate	elimina-
tion	of	the	Taliban	by	the	Bundeswehr	caused	a	shock	in	German	
society.	Franz-Josef	Jung,	the	former	head	of	the	Federal	Ministry	
of	Defence	 in	 the	CDU/CSU/SPD	coalition	and	the	 labour	minis-
ter	in	the	new	CDU/CSU/FDP	government,	was	one	of	the	officials	
who	resigned	amidst	accusations	of	providing	false	information.	
Partly	also	due	to	 this	scandal,	 the	German	government	under-
stood	that	a	further	transformation	of	the	Bundeswehr	along	with	
the	evolution	of	German	foreign	and	security	policy	would	have	to	
be	accepted	by	German	society.	
The	 issue	 of	 the	 social	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 Bundeswehr	 as	 inter-
nationally	deployable	armed	forces	is	 indirectly	linked	with	the	
recruitment of volunteers and candidates for contract and 
professional soldiers. Until	 2011	 mandatory	 military	 service	
served	as	a	recruitment	system32.	Conscription	was	also,	at	least	in	
theory,	part	of	the	“citizen	in	uniform”	philosophy	and	the	“link”	
between	 the	 armed	 forces	 and	 society	which	 co-legitimised	 the	
32	 Mandatory	military	service	 fulfilled	 the	 function	of	 the	recruitment	sys-
tem	despite	the	diminishing	numbers	of	conscripts.	In	1990	the	percentage	
of	 conscripts	 in	 the	Bundeswehr	stood	at	45%,	 in	2010	 it	was	only	 15%.	 In	
recent	years	only	approximately	 17%	of	all	young	men	reaching	draftable	
age	served	in	the	military.	The	majority	performed	civilian	service,	often	
in	 social	 care	 institutions	 in	Germany,	 thus	 in	 fact	 providing	 them	with	
cheap	staff.	The	recruitment	role	of	conscription	started	to	generate	contro-
versies,	while	the	small	proportion	of	conscripts	provoked	questions	about	
“draft	 equality”,	 of	 ensuring	 the	 country’s	 security	 (Wehrgerechtigkeit)	
and	about	the	conformity	of	the	whole	situation	with	the	German	constitu-
tion.	The	course	of	mandatory	military	service	and	the	costs	generated	by	
conscription	were	criticised,	as	well	as	the	point	of	the	mandatory	military	
service	in	the	face	of	the	new	profile	of	the	Bundeswehr.	
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existence	of	 the	Bundeswehr	during	 the	Cold	War.	The	suspen-
sion	 of	 conscription	 in	 2011	meant	not	 only	 an	 abandonment	 of	
the	symbolic	element	of	 social	 legitimacy	but	also	of	a	conveni-
ent	recruitment	system	for	the	armed	forces.	Thus,	this	provided	
another	impetus	to	create	a	new	image	and	identity	for	the	Bun-
deswehr	which	would	be	attractive	for	future	recruits.	
2. The new image and identity of the Bundeswehr 
In	order	to	provide	new	social	legitimacy,	the	Federal	Ministry	of	
Defence	has	 taken	measures	aimed	at	creating the new image 
and identity of the Bundeswehr.	The	measures	are	intended	to	
win	social	acceptance	for	the	new	model	of	the	armed	forces	and	
indirectly	–	to	increase	the	attractiveness	of	the	professional	mili-
tary	service	in	Germany33.
The	emphasis	in	political	discourse	has	always	been	on	the	demo-
cratic	history	of	the	Bundeswehr	over	the	last	50	years34	and	on	its	
participation	in	UN,	NATO	and	EU	operations.	This	has	been	ex-
plained	as	taking	“international	responsibility”	that	corresponds	
to	Germany’s	new	position	in	Europe	and	in	the	world35.	The	new	
element	in	the	political	rethorik	is	the	reference	to	German	“na-
tional	interests”	and	to	the	links	between	the	Bundeswehr’s	par-
ticipation	in	international	operations	and	Germany’s	position	in	
33	 Besides	 the	 financial	 aspects	 and	 the	 possibility	 to	 receive	 high	 qual-
ity	education	in	the	Bundeswehr,	an	important	factor	in	(not)deciding	to	
join	the	armed	forces	–	particularly	in	Germany	–	is	also	the	social	aspect.	
See:	Heiko	Biehl	 /	Bastian	Giegerich	 /	Alexandra	 Jonas,	Aussetzung	der	
Wehrpflicht.	 Erfahrungen	 und	 Lehren	 westlicher	 Partnerstaaten,	 in:	
Wehrpflicht	und	Zivildienst,	Aus	der	Politik	und	Zeitgeschichte,	48/2011,	
November	2011,	pp.	31–38.
34	 The	 earlier	 traditions	 /	 events	 to	which	 the	German	armed	 forces	makes	
reference	 include	only	Prussian	military	 reforms	 from	 1808–1813	 and	 the	
resistance	to	Hitler	in	the	Wehrmacht.	
35	 Burkhard	Köster,	Tradition	in	der	Bundeswehr	–	Tradition	der	Reformen?,	
in:	Karl-Heinz	Lutz,	Martin	Rink,	Marcus	von	Salisch	(ed.),	Reform,	Reor-
ganisation,	Transformation, München	2010,	pp.	317–330.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
5/
20
12
28
global	trade,	jobs	in	German	and	the	income	of	German	citizens36.	
Since	 2010	 the	 government	 has	 also	 started	 to	 inform	 society	
about	the	real	nature	of	the	Bundeswehr’s	activity	in	Afghanistan.	
The	breakthrough	came	when	Defence	Minister,	Karl-Theodor	zu	
Guttenberg,	used	the	taboo	word	“war”	while	referring	to	the	con-
ditions	of	Bundeswehr’s	operation.	
Furthermore,	in	the	last	two	years	the	government	has	been	aim-
ing	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 efforts	 of	 German	 soldiers	 involved	 in	
international	 operations	 and	 to	 commemorate	 those	 who	 were	
killed	 serving	 their	 country.	 In	 2009	 a	monument	was	 built	 in	
Berlin	in	commemoration	of	the	soldiers	and	civilian	employees	
of	the	Bundeswehr	who	were	killed	on	duty	(Ehrenmal	der	Bun-
deswehr).	 In	2008	the	Bundeswehr	Cross	of	Honour	for	Bravery	
(Ehrenkreuz	der	Bundeswehr	für	Tapferkeit)	was	introduced	into	
the	 catalogue	 of	 the	military	decorations	 of	 the	German	 armed	
forces.	This	 is	 the	first	decoration	of	 this	 type	 since	World	War	
II	 to	 be	 awarded	 by	 the	 Federal	Ministry	 of	 Defence	 to	 honour	
outstanding	 achievements	 of	 German	 soldiers	 in	 international	
operations37.	An	 important	signal	was	given	 in	April	2010	when	
Chancellor	Angela	Merkel	 for	 the	 first	 time	 participated	 in	 the	
memorial	 service	 in	honour	of	 three	 soldiers	killed	 in	Afghani-
stan.	This	was	 interpreted	as	a	commemoration	of	 their	service	
for	the	country.	
36	 In	May	2010	German	President	Horst	Köhler	felt	forced	to	leave	his	office	af-
ter	the	stark	criticism	from	public	opinion	in	Germany,	when	he	made	a	link	
between	 the	participation	of	 the	Bundeswehr	 in	 international	operations	
with	the	protection	of	Germany’s	economic	interests.	However,	in	autumn	
of	 the	 same	 year	 the	Defence	Minister,	 zu	Guttenberg,	 repeated	Köhler’s	
arguments.	See:	Anna	Kwiatkowska-Drożdż,	The natural	resources	deficit: 
the implications for German	politics,	OSW	Commentary,	February	2011.	
37	 Franz	 Josef	 Jung,	Soldatisches	Dienen	anerkennen,	Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung,	 09.10.2008,	 http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NY1R
C4IwFIX_0aaURr0VEUVQj2UvMt11XnGb3F0Noh_fDDwHzsv3wZEvGe-
vUhEYxeqd6-ZRFjbvqLSo7GWHRYWAgHK0wEOoW65ah_LMJiAE1mtG-
ZsIhlAOQy3WaZ0NSQcp_OB2i66MjHfKZB1N4Bz8vgGOMaUuxJDJ64n8lI-
FIlALYskPR6SNFmSfjfX03m1zvL8cjvd5WDt_gc9kCbv/	
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The	Federal	Ministry	of	Defence	is	also	promoting	the	civic	char-
acter	of	military	service:	the	Bundeswehr	is	to	contribute	to	main-
taining	the	model	of	a	free	and	democratic	Germany.	This	aspect	
is	 intended	 to	 replace	 the	 integrating	 role	 formerly	 assigned	 to	
conscription	and	to	establish	the	“link”	between	the	professional	
armed	 forces	 and	 society.	 The	 civic	 duty	 dimension	 of	 the	 new	
identity	 is	 emphasised	 particularly	 in	 the	 information	 and	 re-
cruitment	campaign	run	by	the	Federal	Ministry	of	Defence	un-
der	the	slogan	“Wir.Dienen.Deutschland” (We.Serve.Germany)38.	
38	 Bundesministerium	der	Verteidigung,	http://www.wirdienendeutschland.
de/selbstverstaendnis.html	
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iV. the implications for nato and the eu
The	 foundations	 of	 the	 present	 reform	 along	with	 the	 develop-
ment	 of	 German	 security	 policy	will	 both	 influence	 Germany’s	
approach	to	political	and	military	cooperation	within	NATO	and	
the	EU.	
1. The implications for political cooperation within NATO 
and the EU 
The	current	Bundeswehr	reform	and	the	evolution	of	Germany’s	
security	 policy	 will	 bring	 about	 a	 progressing	 redefinition of 
Germany’s membership in nato and the eu.	Germany’s	mem-
bership	 in	NATO	 and	 its	 involvement	 in	 the	 Common	 Security	
and	Defence	Policy	are	unquestionable	in	Germany.	In	future	the	
Bundeswehr	will	 conduct	 operations	within	NATO,	 the	EU	 and	
the	UN	in	cooperation	with	the	armed	forces	of	the	partner	coun-
tries.	With	political	cohesion	faltering	both	within	NATO	and	the	
EU,	Germany	will	intensify	its	instrumental	approach	to	the	two	
organisations	as	platforms	used	to	achieve	its	own	objectives,	not	
institutions	which	are	setting	the	political	orientation	and	opera-
tional	involvement	of	the	Bundeswehr39.	As	was	the	case	of	Libya,	
Germany	will	not	participate	in	operations	which	are	not	conver-
gent	with	or	are	contradictory	to	Germany’s	interests	and	politi-
cal	goals.	On	the	other	hand,	Germany	is	concerned	that	its	allies	
(the	US,	France	and	the	UK)	will	reach	for	“coalitions	of	the	will-
ing”	more	often	than	is	necessary	and	that	such	operations	may	
have	negative	impact	on	German	political	and	economic	interests	
in	the	relevant	regions.	In	future	Germany	may	therefore	be	con-
fronted	with	the	following	choice:	either	it	agrees	to	an	unwanted	
engagement	 and	 thus	 influences	 the	 operation,	 or	 it	 opposes	 it	
and	 thus	has	no	 considerable	 influence	on	 the	actions	 taken	by	
the	coalition.	
39	 Justyna	Gotkowska,	No	more	compulsory	engagement.	The	emancipation	of	
German	security	policy,	OSW	Commentary,	July	2011.
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The	term	“national interest”,	which	until	recently	was	taboo	in	
Germany,	has	currently	become	a	norm	in	the	vocabulary	of	Ger-
man	politicians.	Accordingly,	it	will	be	in	the	German	interest	to	
take	part	 in	 international	operations	 set	 to	prevent	phenomena	
which	may	have	a	negative	impact	on	the	international	economic	
flow	and	thus	affect	economic	growth	in	Germany	and	its	global	
position,	in	the	shorter	or	longer	term.	Taking	over	responsibility	
in	international	politics	is	mentioned	as	another	criterion	when	
deciding	on	German	military	engagement	abroad.	Others	include:	
taking	part	 in	parallel	operations,	 the	predicted	duration	of	 the	
planned	operation	and	clear	conditions	for	its	completion	as	well	
as	the	possible	consequences	Germany	would	face	if	it	refused	to	
participate40.	 There	 are	 few	 international	 operations	with	Bun-
deswehr	involvement	which	Germany	sees	as	serving	its	interests.	
One	example	of	these	is	the	EU’s	Operation	Atalanta;	this	is	set	to	
secure	maritime	routes	off	the	coast	of	Somalia	against	pirate	at-
tacks.	Others	are	the	stabilisation	operations	(KFOR	and	EUFOR)	
in	the	Balkans	–	a	region	which	Germany	treats	as	its	“sphere	of	
responsibility”	in	the	EU’s	direct	neighbourhood.	The	deployment	
of	the	Bundeswehr	in	missions	of	a	different	type	than	that	men-
tioned	above	will	rather	not	be	in	Germany’s	interest.	The	grow-
ing	energy	and	economic	links	as	well	as	the	development	of	good	
relations	with	emerging	economies	(BRIC)	will	contribute	to	Ger-
many’s	reluctance	to	take	part	in	NATO	and	EU	operations	in	the	
regions	perceived	as	the	spheres	of	influence	of	these	countries.	
Germany	will	 also	be	cautious	 in	engaging	 in	missions	 in	Mus-
lim	countries,	mainly	in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa,	as	this	
could	affect	its	positive	image	and	have	implications	for	its	politi-
cal	and	economic	position	in	these	regions.	The	instruments	from	
the	 areas	 of	 diplomacy,	 development	 policy,	 political,	 economic	
and	financial	cooperation	as	well	as	police	and	military	coopera-
tion	are	sufficient	and	are	the	preferred	tools	of	protecting	Ger-
man	 interests.	 For	 these	 reasons,	 in	 future	 crises	 and	 conflicts	
40	 See:	 Thomas	 de	Maizière,	 speech	 at	 the	 8th	Handelsblatt	 conference	 „Si-
cherheitspolitik	und	Verteidigungsindustrie”	in	Berlin,	25.11.2011.	
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Germany	will	 rather	opt	 for	diplomatic	 solutions	within	NATO,	
the	EU	and	the	UN.	It	will	also	seek	to	use	and	strengthen	civil-
ian	instruments	of	conflict	prevention	and	crisis	response41.	Ger-
many	does	analyse	the	consequences	of	the	increased	economic,	
military	and	political	importance	of	the	“new	powers”	on	its	po-
sition	and	 interests	–	 the	competition	 for	political	 influence,	di-
minishing	natural	resources	and	access	to	markets.	But	the	Ger-
man	answer	is	to	support	the	establishment	of	NATO’s	“strategic	
partnerships”	with	non-NATO	countries	 (above	all	with	Russia,	
but	also	with	other	 “new	powers”)	 through	confidence	building	
measures,	political	 and	military	contacts,	 consultations	and	co-
operation	on	joint	projects42.
2. The implications for military cooperation within NATO 
and the EU 
With	an	evolving	approach	to	political	cooperation,	the	German	
take	 on	 the	 objectives	 and	 principles	 of	military	 cooperation	 is	
also	changing,	also	in	the	context	of	the	discussion	on	strength-
ening	military	cooperation	within	NATO	and	the	EU.
Germany will not be ready to become involved in cooperation 
which could result in a permanent interdependence between 
partners with regard to capabilities used in international 
operations. This	applies	above	all	to	units	of	the	army,	air	force	
and	 the	 navy	 conducting	 combat	 operations.	 Germany	 is	 con-
cerned	that	interdependence	in	such	capabilities	shared	with	its	
41	 In	the	tripartite	Weimar	 initiative	(see	footnote	47),	put	 forward	together	
with	Poland	and	France,	Germany	was	above	all	interested	in	the	establish-
ment	of	permanent	civilian	and	military	headquarters	(EUHQ)	–	in	order	
to	strengthen	the	civilian	component	of	EU	crisis	response	and	better	co-
ordination	with	military	 structures	 in	performing	 future	EU	operations.	
See:	Claudia	Major,	Ein	zivil-militärisches	Hauptquartier	für	die	EU.	SWP-
Aktuell,	October	2010.
42	 See:	Thomas	de	Maizière,	speech	“Die	deutsche	Rolle	in	der	internationalen	
Sicherheitsarchitektur”	made	at	the	“German	Conference“	at	Harvard	Uni-
versity,	Boston,	20.02.2012.	
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main	partners	(France	and	the	UK)	may	lead	to	political	pressure	
for	Germany	to	engage	in	operations	supported	by	these	countries	
but	not	necessarily	convergent	with	German	interests.	 It	 is	pre-
cisely	due	 to	 this	 reason	 that	Germany’s	main	partners	 (France	
and	the	UK)	do	not	want	to	engage	in	this	kind	of	cooperation	with	
Germany	either,	since	in	the	past	a	lack	of	German	consent	either	
made	joint	units	deployment	on	EU	or	NATO	operations	difficult	
or	impossible.	Germany	thus	put	itself	in	a	difficult	political	po-
sition.	This	was	the	case	with	EU	Battle	Groups43	and	the	NATO	
AWACS	unit44.	The	Franco-British	agreement	for	greater	military	
cooperation	from	November	2010	and	the	policy	of	excluding	col-
laboration	with	Germany	which	followed	it45	best	 illustrates	the	
attitude	of	France	and	the	UK	towards	cooperation	with	Germany.	
Germany will however take part in projects of (limited) co­
operation which do not restrict Germany’s ability to act au­
tonomously and flexibly and which generate military and 
political gains in selected areas. Germany	will	continue	its	pre-
sent	engagement	in	pooling	and	sharing/smart	defence	projects46	
43	 Germany	blocked	the	use	of	EU	Battle	Groups	with	the	participation	of	the	
Bundeswehr	in	2006	(Chad)	and	in	2008	(Congo).	See:	Claudia	Major	/	Chris-
tian	Mölling,	EU-Battlegroups.	Bilanz und	Optionen	zur	Weiterentwicklung	
europäischer	Krisenreaktionskräfte,	SWP-Studie,	August	2010,	p.	22-23.
44	 German	soldiers	make	up	a	third	of	the	NATO	AWACS	unit.	Germany	did	
not	allow	their	participation	in	the	AWACS	unit	operation	in	the	NATO	mis-
sion	in	Libya.	It	may	have	considerably	hampered	the	unit’s	operations	if	the	
German	government	had	not	allowed	the	participation	of	Bundeswehr	sol-
diers	in	the	unit’s	operation	in	Afghanistan.	This	decision	was	made	under	
pressure	from	the	allies	and	due	to	fierce	criticism	within	NATO	of	the	Ger-
man	stance	on	Libya.	Earlier,	due	to	domestic	policy,	Germany	had	rejected	
NATO’s	request	to	allow	the	participation	of	German	soldiers	in	the	AWACS	
unit	 operation	 in	Afghanistan.	 See:	 The	German	mission	 in	Afghanistan	
depends	on	local	elections,	BEST	OSW,	19.01.2011,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/
sites/default/files/CEWEEKLY_99.pdf	
45	 Tom	 Kington	 /	 Albrecht	 Müller, Italy,	 Germany	 make	 their	 own	 pacts.	
Agreements	a	reaction	to	snub	by	French-UK	Deal, 19.12.2011,	http://www.
defensenews.com/article/20111219/DEFFEAT04/112190321/Italy-Germany-
Make-Their-Own-Pacts	
46	 E.g.	European	Air	Transport	Command	 (EATC),	Alliance	Ground	Surveil-
lance	(AGS)	or	Baltic	Air	Policing.
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and	will	become	involved	in	new	ones	in	the	EU	and	NATO.	Nev-
ertheless	this	cooperation	will	have	a	limited	scope.	It	may	cover	
support	units	which	do	not	take	part	in	international	operations,	
strategic	and	tactical	airlift	units,	the	area	of	education	and	train-
ing	as	well	as	maritime	patrolling	(important	for	Germany	with	
regard	to	preventing	e.g.	piracy),	and	air	policing	resulting	from	
NATO’s	Article	5	commitments.	
In	response	to	the	Franco-British	agreement,	Germany	along	with	
Sweden	in	the	Ghent	Initiative	suggested	exploring	the	possibili-
ties	 of	 strengthening	 European	 military	 cooperation	 through	
pooling	and	sharing	projects.	They	also	provided	examples	of	pos-
sible	areas	of	cooperation47.	For	Germany,	pooling	and	sharing	co-
operation	can improve	certain	capabilities	at	the	European	level	
(e.g.	 strategic	and	 tactical	airlift,	maritime	patrolling,	air	polic-
ing).	Germany	would	also	like	to	use	possible	European	projects	
in	order	to	maintain	and	reinforce	the	structures	of	the	German	
armed	forces	(e.g.	through	the	common	use	of	the	Bundeswehr’s	
training	and	exercise	centres).	Germany’s	approach	to	European	
47	 The	Ghent	 Initiative.	 In	 the	document	 submitted	by	German	and	Sweden	
in	November	2010	three	categories	of	capabilities	were	specified:	(1)	capa-
bilities	 and	 support	 structures	 that	 are	 deemed	 essential	 for	 individual	
nations	and	therefore	maintained	on	a	strictly	national	level	(e.g.	capabili-
ties	relating	to	combat,	combat	support	and	combat	service	support	forces,	
intelligence,	fighter	airplanes	and	warships).	 In	this	category	cooperation	
can	 extend	 as	 far	 as	 to	 increasing	 interoperability;	 (2) capabilities	 and	
support	 structures	where	 closer	 cooperation	 is	 possible	without creating	
too	strong	dependencies	e.g.	in	the	form	of	pooling	capabilities (e.g.	non	de-
ployable	support	forces	and	operational	training	forces	as	well	as	selected	
capabilities	such	as	strategic	and	tactical	airlift	and	logistics	capabilities).	
In	 the	 latter	 area	 the	Bundeswehr	 is	 currently	 taking	part	 in	 the	 follow-
ing	initiatives:	the	NATO	Strategic	Airlift	Capability	and	the	European	Air	
Transport	Fleet);	(3) capabilities and support structures where mutual 
dependency and reliance upon european partners is acceptable in the 
european role– and task­sharing framework (e.g.	support	structures	re-
quired	for	education,	training	and	exercises	or	capabilities	relating	to	tasks	
such	as	maritime	patrolling	or	air	policing).	See:	Ghent	Initiative.	European	
Imperative.	Intensifying	Military	Cooperation	in	Europe,	November	2010,	
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/
dv/sede260511deseinitiative_/sede260511deseinitiative_en.pdf	
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cooperation	is	shown	best	by	its	offer	to	build	permanent	EU	civil-
military	operational	headquarters	on	the	Bundeswehr	Response	
Forces	Operations	Command	in	Ulm	–	this	is	set	to	be	dismantled	
as	part	of	 the	current	 reform48.	Within	 its	military	cooperation	
Germany	will	also	attempt	to	support	 its	own	defence	industry.	
In	the	context	of	the	economic	crisis	and	expenditure	cuts	made	
in	the	defence	sector	in	the	EU,	Germany’s	objective	is	to	maintain	
production	capacities	and	to	guarantee	the	technological	develop-
ment	of	the	German	defence	companies.	
Despite	the	fact	that	Germany	(with	Sweden)	authored	the	propos-
al	to	strengthen	European	military	cooperation,	Germany	is	now	
seeking	to	diminish	expectations	regarding	this	kind	of	coopera-
tion	within	the	EU	and	NATO.	It	indicates	that	such	cooperation	
will	not	provide	a	lifeline	for	maintaining	the	capabilities	of	the	
armed	forces	and	developing	new	ones	in	a	time	of	savings	in	the	
area	 of	 defence.	Germany	 is	 rather	 recommending	 several	 new	
projects	be	focused	upon.	The	German	Defence	Minister,	Thomas	
de	Maizière,	in	February	2012	even	called	for	a	sober	and	realistic	
outlook	on	 smart	defence	and	pooling	and	sharing	projects	and	
stressed	the	importance	of	the	political	and	military	limitations	
of	this	type	of	cooperation49.	
Justyna GotKowsKa
Text completed February 2012
48	 Julian	 Hale,	 Germany	 to	 press	 maritime	 patrol	 aircraft	 pool,	 29.07.2011,	
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20110729/DEFSECT05/107290307/	
Germany-to-Press-Maritime-Patrol-Aircraft-Pool	
49	 Thomas	 de	Maizière,	 the	 speech	made	 at	 the	 48th	Munich	 Security	 Conference,	
03.02.2012,	http://www.securityconference.de/Dr-Thomas-de-Maiziere.809.0.html	
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appendix 
the most important reforms of the Bundeswehr 
and their context (1990–2004)
1. 1993: Volker Rühe’s reform
After	 Germany’s	 reunification	 the	 Bundeswehr	 started	 to	 par-
ticipate	 in	UN,	NATO	 and	WEU	 (Western	 European	Union)	 op-
erations.	 As	 early	 as	 in	 1991	 Germany	 supported	 the	militarily	
operations	of	 the	anti-Iraq	coalition,	despite	 the	 fact	 that	Chan-
cellor	Helmut	Kohl	refused	to	involve	the	Bundeswehr	directly	in	
the	Gulf	War.	In	1992	the	Bundeswehr	took	part	in	the	UN	opera-
tion	in	Cambodia	(UNTAC,	medical	units)	and	in	1993	–	in	the	UN	
operation	 in	 Somalia	 (UNOSOM,	 logistics	 units).	Next,	German	
military	engagement	abroad	was	extended	to	the	participation	of	
German	navy	units	 in	NATO	and	 the	WEU	Sharp	Guard opera-
tion	on	the	Adriatic	to	implement	the	UN	economic	sanctions	and	
arms	embargo	against	the	former	Yugoslavia.	
German	politicians	and	military	officials	were	aware	of	the	security	
environment	transformation	and	of	its	consequences	for	NATO	and	
Germany	and	thus	for	the	structure	of	the	Bundeswehr.	However,	
due	to	the	domestic	situation,	they	attempted	to	maintain	domesti-
cally	that	the	Bundeswehr’s	international	operations	are	only	com-
plementary	to	the	main	task	of	the	German	armed	forces,	i.e.	defend-
ing	the	country	and	its	NATO	allies.	This	“duality”	was	reflected	in	
the	Defence	Policy	Guidelines	(VPR)	published	by	Defence	Minister	
Volker	Rühe	in	1992.	According	to	the	document	the	threat	of	a	con-
ventional	attack	on	German	and	NATO	territory	was	highly	unlike-
ly;	however	the	threat	of	conflicts	in	Germany’s	further	geographical	
surroundings	was	increasing.	Tasks	related	to	crisis	response	opera-
tions	were	thus	in	the	future	to	replace	tasks	related	to	territorial	de-
fence.	Nevertheless	the	Guidelines	still	defined	the	territorial	defence	
of	Germany	and	NATO	as	the	Bundeswehr’s	main	task,	defining	the	
participation	of	a	limited	number	of	units	in	international	peace	and	
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stabilisation	operations	only	as	complementary.	Therefore	a	division	
was	made	in	the	new	structure	of	the	Bundeswehr,	splitting	it	into:	
main	 defence	 forces	 (Hauptverteidigungskräfte),	 crisis	 response	
forces	 (Krisenreaktionskräfte,	 approx.	 50,000	 soldiers)	 and	 basic	
military	organisation	(Grundorganisation	der	Streitkräfte)50.	The	to-
tal	number	of	troops	was	to	reach	370,000	in	1995.	The	Bundeswehr	
thus	 began	 to	 have	 a	 certain	 double	 structure.	 The	main	 body	 of	
the	army	was	made	up	of	main	defence	forces,	based	on	mandatory	
military	 service	 (54.5%	 of	 soldiers	were	 conscripts).	Main	 defence	
forces	were	tasked	with	territorial	defence	and	composed	mainly	of	
armoured	units.	Crisis	response	forces	were	a	complementary	and	
smaller	component.	However,	they	were	undergoing	the	process	of	
the	 equipment	modernisation	 and	professionalisation	 -	 they	were	
made	up	of	contract	and	professional	soldiers	as	well	as	longer	serv-
ing	conscripts51.	As	part	of	this	reorganisation	the	Bundeswehr	Com-
mand	Centre	was	also	created	as	a	planning	and	command	and	con-
trol	headquarters	for	international	operations.	Until	then,	due	to	full	
integration	in	NATO	command	structures	during	the	Cold	War,	the	
German	armed	forces	in	the	early	1990s	were	unable	to	deploy	units	
under	 national	 command	 in	 international	 operations52.	 Alongside	
the	belief	that	changes	to	Germany’s	defence	policy	must	be	intro-
duced	slowly	and	gradually,	a	lack	of	deeper	reforms	in	the	structure,	
organisation,	equipment	and	training	of	the	Bundeswehr	was	due	to	
the	high	cost	of	the	Germany’s	reunification.	The	integration	of	the	
National	 People’s	 Army	 (Nationale	 Volksarmee)	 into	 Bundeswehr	
structures,	the	reduction	in	number	of	the	all-German	armed	forc-
es53	conducted	in	parallel	with	the	evolution	from	an	armed	forces	
50	 Bundesministerium	der	Verteidigung,	Verteidigungspolitische	Richtlinien	
1992,	Bonn,	26.11.1992.
51	 Heiko	 Biehl,	 Die	 neue	 Bundeswehr,	 SOWI-Arbeitspapier,	 Nr.	 112,	 August	
1998,	pp.	23.
52	 Sven	 Bernhard	 Gareis,	 Militärische	 Beiträge	 zur	 Sicherheit,	 in:	 Stephan	
Böckenförde	/	Sven	Bernhard	Gareis	(publishing	house),	Deutsche	Sicher-
heitspolitik,	Opladen	2009,	pp.	116-117.
53	 Due	to	provisions	of	the	2+4	Treaty	Germany	agreed	to	reduce	the	number	of	
troops	of	the	reunified	Germany	to	370,000	soldiers	by	the	end	of	1994.
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charged	with	the	task	of	territorial	defence	into	a	mobile	and	world-
wide	deployable	military	would	have	been	difficult	to	achieve	–	both	
in	political	and	financial	terms.	Firstly,	German	society	felt	increas-
ingly	secure	and	wanted	to	take	advantage	of	the	“peace	dividend”.	
Secondly,	the	integration	of	East	Germany	incurred	increased	social	
and	infrastructural	expenditure	for	the	German	government54.	Yet	
already	in	the	1990s	decisions	had	been	made	on	the	development	of	
new	technologies,	future	purchases	and	the	modernisation	of	mili-
tary	equipment	with	regard	to	conducting	international	operations55.
2. 1999: Rudolf Scharping’s reform
Civil	war	in	the	former	Yugoslavia	accelerated	changes	in	Germa-
ny’s	security	policy,	bringing	about	a	change	in	the	doctrine	of	us-
ing	the	armed	forces.	The	Western	Balkans	were	too	close	a	region	
geographically	 for	 Germany	 not	 to	 engage	 in	 their	 stabilisation,	
both	politically	and	militarily.	The	Bundeswehr’s	participation	in	
operations	 in	 the	 former	 Yugoslavia	 was	 to	 become	 a	 milestone	
for	the	German	military	out-of-area	engagement	and	contributed	
to	 breaking	many	 taboos.	 In	 1995	 the	German	units	 participated	
in	NATO’s	 IFOR	operation	 and	were	 stationed	 in	Croatia.	 “Kohl’s	
doctrine”	was	binding	and	according	to	it	German	soldiers	should	
not	 take	part	 in	operations	 in	countries	which	were	occupied	by	
the	 Third	 Reich	 during	World	War	 II.	 However,	 already	 in	 1996	
the	German	contingent	was	moved	from	Croatia	to	Bosnia	as	part	
of	NATO’s	SFOR	operation	which	replaced	IFOR.	Emphasising	the	
peace	 and	 stabilising	 character	 of	 the	 SFOR	 operation,	 in	which	
German	soldiers	were	assigned	mainly	logistic	and	medical	tasks,	
54	 „The development of the eastern German federal states is a priority for the Ger-
man government and will consume significant funds in the immediate future. The 
politico-economic concept of Germany’s security must take into account not only 
future challenges, but also the difficult financial situation of the federal budget”. 
See:	 Bundesministerium	der	Verteidigung,	Verteidigungspolitische	 Rich-
tlinien 1992,	Bonn,	26.11.1992.
55	 They	included: A	400M	strategic	transport	aircraft,	Puma	infantry	fighting	
vehicle,	Tiger	helicopter	(change	of	specification	from	the	original	antitank	
helicopter	into	the	combat	version).
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was	meant	then	to	secure	domestic	legitimacy.	The	greatest	break-
through	 came	however	when	Germany	 decided	 to	 participate	 in	
NATO’s	Allied	Force	air	operation	in	1999,	whose	objective	was	to	
put	an	end	to	ethnic	cleansing	in	Kosovo.	For	the	first	time	since	the	
end	of	World	War	II	German	armed	forces	 (the	air	 force)	partici-
pated	in	a	combat	operation	which	moreover	was	not	 legitimised	
by	the	UN.	Additionally,	Germany	was	engaged	in	the	stabilisation	
of	Kosovo	-	not	only	did	it	send	a	large	military	contingent	(8,500	
soldiers)	as	part	of	the	international	KFOR	forces	led	by	NATO	-	it	
also,	for	the	first	time,	took	command	over	one	of	the	sectors	during	
deployment	abroad	(in	Kosovo).	The	slogan	“No more Auschwitz” be-
came	the	justification	for	the	Bundeswehr’s	operations	in	Kosovo	–	
Germany	started	to	support	the	doctrine	to	prevent	ethnic	cleans-
ing	and	humanitarian	disasters,	including	by	military	means.
The	growing	German	military	involvement	in	former	Yugoslavia	
laid	bare	the	problems	with	maintaining	the	Bundeswehr’s	struc-
ture.	 Organisationally	 the	 Bundeswehr	 was	 not	 well	 prepared	
for	 the	planned	development	of	military	capabilities	within	 the	
EU’s	European	Security	and	Defence	Policy	created	at	the	end	of	
the	 1990s.	 In	 1999	 the	SPD/Greens	government	decided	 to	carry	
out	 a	new	 reform.	The	 assumptions	 of	Defence	Minister	Rudolf	
Scharping	 were	 accepted.	 Territorial	 defence	 and	 maintaining	
the	appropriate	Bundeswehr	structure	was	still	the	main	point	of	
reference	along	with	a	further	strengthening	of	the	expedition-
ary	component.	The	Bundeswehr	was	to	be	reduced	to	282,000	sol-
diers	(200,000	professional	and	contract	soldiers,	approximately	
77,000	conscripts	and	5,000	reservists).	A	division	was	introduced	
into	 the	basic	military	organisation	 (Militärische	Grundorgani-
sation,	 105,000	 soldiers)	 and	 operational	 forces	 (Einsatzkräfte,	
150,000	soldiers)	which	were	both	to	serve	for	territorial	defence	
and	 to	 be	 deployed	 in	 international	 operations56.	 Furthermore,	
56	 Hans-Dieter	 Lemke,	 Bundeswehrreform.	 Schwachpunkt	Krisenfähigkeit,	
SWP-aktuell,	No.	 66,	November	 2000,	 http://www.swp-berlin.org/filead-
min/contents/products/aktuell/aktu_66_sicher.pdf	
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the	 Central	 Medical	 Service	 (Sanitätsdienst)	 and	 Joint	 Support	
Service	 (Streitkräftebasis)	 were	 created,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Armed	
Forces	 Operational	 Command	 (Einsatzführungskommando)	 to	
run	operations	abroad.	
3. 2003/2004: Peter Struck’s reform
Quite	soon	however,	the	SPD/Greens	government	made	a	decision	
on	a	further	reform	which,	due	to	political	and	military	reasons,	
proved	to	be	a	breakthrough	reform.	The	government	redefined	
the	mission	and	tasks	of	the	Bundeswehr	and	decided	on	a	com-
plete	transformation	from	a	military	prepared	and	trained	for	con-
ventional	defence	tasks	into	a	mobile	and	worldwide	deployable	
military.	In	2003	Defence	Minister	Peter	Struck	(SPD)	published	
a	 new	 Defence	 Policy	 Guidelines	 (VPR)	 and	 in	 2004	 issued	 the	
new	Concept	of	the	Bundeswehr	based	on	the	Guidelines.	In	both	
documents	 the	 Federal	Ministry	 of	Defence	 proclaimed	 a	radi­
cal change of priorities, tasks	and	capabilities	development	of	
the	Bundeswehr.	A	definitive	change	of	the	security	environment	
and	the	lack	of	foreseeable	conventional	threats	to	Germany	were	
stated.	The	notion	of	“defence”	was	extended	to	include	the	fight	
against	 unconventional	 threats	 such	 as	 international	 terrorism	
as	well	 as	 conflict	 prevention	 and	 crisis	management.	A	 quota-
tion	from	Struck’s	preface	to	the	new	Concept	of	the	Bundeswehr	
2004	encapsulates	the	new	approach:	“We	have	to	react	to	threats	
where	they	appear,	for	if	we	do	not	take	any	steps	they	may	have	
a	negative	influence	on	our	security,	even	if	they	arise	in	remote	
regions”57.	The	decision	about	 the	reform	was	 influenced	by	 the	
September	 11th	 terrorist	 attacks	 as	 they	 created	a	new	political	
and	security	situation	for	the	West;	it	was	also	influenced	by	the	
Bundeswehr’s	problems	in	conducting	the	OEF-A	and	ISAF	opera-
tions	in	Afghanistan.	The	problems	highlighted	the	fact	that	the	
Bundeswehr	must	 introduce	greater	changes	 in	structure,	mili-
57	 Bundesministerium	der	Verteidigung,	Grundzüge	der	Konzeption	der	Bun-
deswehr,	Berlin	2004,	pp.	2	–	3.	
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tary	equipment	and	training	and	in	the	conducting	of	joint	opera-
tions	in	order	to	be	able	to	perform	tasks	in	completely	different	
conditions	than	had	previously	been	the	norm.
In	order	to	describe	the	reform,	the	Federal	Ministry	of	Defence	
adopted	the	US	concept	of	military	transformation	understood	
as	a	constant	process	of	adjusting	the	Bundeswehr	to	the	world’s	
changing	political,	social,	economic	and	technological	challenges.	
“Transformation”	was	not	only	to	lead	to	a	defined	goal,	but	to	be	
a	goal	itself.	Thus	reforms	in	the	German	armed	forces	were	in-
troduced	that	were	adequate	to	the	changes	in	German	security	
policy.	 The	 capabilities,	 structure	 and	 the	 number	 of	 troops	 of	
the	Bundeswehr	were	 to	depend	above	 all	 on	 the	 requirements	
and	conditions	of	performing	 joint	and	combined	operations	 (of	
the	branches	of	 the	Bundeswehr	and	 in	cooperation	with	allied	
and	partner	armed	forces)	and	not	on	its	preparedness	for	terri-
torial	defence.	The	reduction	in	the	number	of	troops	to	250,000	
soldiers	was	made	 (up	 to	 195,000	professional	 and	 contract	 sol-
diers,	 30,000	 conscripts	 and	 25,000	 voluntarily	 longer	 serving	
conscripts).	The	process	of	switching	to	a	model	of	an	expedition-
ary	military	did	not,	however,	included	the	abolition	of	conscrip-
tion;	 the	number	of	conscripts	was	only	 limited	and	mandatory	
military	 service	 was	 reduced	 from	 ten	 to	 nine	months.	 A	 new	
categorisation	of	the	armed	forces	was	introduced.	The	new	cat-
egories	were	related	exclusively	to	the	ability	of	performing	tasks	
in	 international	 operations.	 A	 division	 was	 made	 into:	 the	 re-
sponse	 forces	 (Eingreifskräfte, 35,000	 soldiers)	 to	perform	high	
intensity	tasks	and	to	run	rescue	and	evacuation	operations;	the	
stabilisation	forces	(Stabilisierungskräfte,	70,000	troops)	to	con-
duct	 low	and	medium	intensity	operations	aimed	at	peacekeep-
ing,	 the	 support	 forces	 (Unterstützungskräfte,	 approx.	 147,000	
soldiers)	 for	 logistic,	 organisational	 and	 technical	 support,	 for	
command	and	control	in	international	operations	and	for	main-
taining	Bundeswehr	 infrastructure	 in	Germany.	 Emphasis	was	
placed	on	the	development	of	the	capabilities	required	to	conduct	
joint	 international	 operations:	 a	 network-centric	 command	 and	
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control	system,	reconnaissance,	tactical	and	strategic	transport,	
operational	effectiveness,	support	and	supply	and	the	protection	
of	soldiers	during	operations.	At	the	command	level	 the	compe-
tences	of	the	General	Inspector	of	the	Bundeswehr	were	strength-
ened.	Furthermore,	new	structures	were	created;	apart	from	the	
Armed	Forces	Operational	Command,	which	had	existed	since	the	
Scharping/Kujat	 reform,	 the	 Response	 Forces	 Operations	 Com-
mand	and	 the	Special	 Forces	Operations	Command	were	 estab-
lished.
